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IN SEARCH OF "LAISSEZ-FAIRE CONSTITUTIONALISM"
Matthew J. Lindsay*

1. INTRODUCTION

For nearly a century, legal scholars have been engaged in an ongoing investigation into the origins and nature of "laissez-faire constitutionalism." In its most general terms, "laissez-faire constitutionalism"
refers to the notion that, beginning some time in the second half of the
nineteenth century and culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court's 1905
decision in Lochner v. New York,l state and federal courts hemmed in
governmental intervention into the economy by imposing a host of
new, or at least newly robust, constitutional conditions on the authority
of the states to exercise their police powers. Scholars generally agree
that this so-called "Lochner era" continued until 1937, when the New
Deal Court finally relaxed constitutional scrutiny of police regulations,
thus setting the state legislatures free. 2
Two distinct, successive, and in some respects conflicting historical
interpretations have dominated our understanding of Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence. The first, which is typically labeled the
"progressive"3 view, first emerged as a contemporaneous critique of
"laissez-faire constitutionalism" and became ascendant in the decades
following the New Deal. According to progressive scholars, American
judges steeped in laissez-faire economic theory, who identified with the
nation's capitalist class and harbored contempt for any effort to redistribute wealth or otherwise meddle with the private marketplace,

* Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I am grateful to Ajay Mehrotra,
c.]. Peters, Kim Reilly, Garrett Epps, David Fontana, and Dan Sharfstein for their helpful
comments.
1 198 U.S. 45 (I 905) (striking down New York State law limiting the number of hours worked
by bakers under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also Morehead v.
New York ex rei. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (I936) (striking down New York State minimum wage
law, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (I923) (striking down federal law establishing minimum wages for women and children in the District of Columbia under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
2 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (I937) (upholding the constitutionality
of a Washington State minimum wage law). See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 279-344 (I998); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT (I998); Forum, The Debate Over the Constitutional Revolution of I937, I IO AM.
HIST. REV. I046 (2005); James A. Henretta, Charles Evans Hughes and the Strange Death of Liberal America, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. lIS (2006).
3 The term "progressive" in this context refers to the legal dimension of the early twentiethcentury Progressive movement, rather than contemporary left-leaning political "progressives."
55
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acted on their own economic and political biases to strike down legislation that threatened to burden corporations or disturb the existing
economic hierarchy. In order to mask this fit of legally unjustified, intellectually dishonest judicial activism, the progressive interpretation
runs, judges invented novel economic "rights" - most notably "substantive due process" and "liberty of contract" - that they engrafted
upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
While the progressive interpretation continues to influence many
commentators and judges,5 a subsequent generation of scholarship has
undermined some of its key premises and conclusions. Since the
1970s, legal historians and constitutional scholars have traced the main
strands of Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence back to the Jacksonian aversion to "class" legislation,6 to the anti-slavery movement's
adulation of individual economic liberty as a constitutive element of
human freedom,? and to the nation's traditional social contract vision
of political membership.s Taken together, these studies comprise a
comprehensive historical revision of the progressive narrative that
4 See, e.g., ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW (I960);
CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 393, 52o-21 (I943);
BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (I942); Max Lerner, The Supreme
Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE L.J. 668 (I933). The progressive interpretation drew
heavily on contemporaneous criticism of Lochner-era jurisprudence, most notably Justice
Holmes's famous dissent in Lochner itself, which accused the majority of striking down the challenged maximum hours law based on "an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
5 As Professor Gary Rowe writes, even today, decades after Lochner itself has been dead and
buried, the progressive narrative
haunts every judge's chambers and every constitutional law classroom. It gives force to
the never-ending debate between judicial activism and judicial restraint. It generates
the famed tension between judicial review and democracy. To Lochner is to sin, egregiously. Indeed, avoiding 'Lochner's error' remains the central obsession, the (oftentimes
articulate) major premise, of contemporary constitutional law.
Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 22I, 223 (I999) (footnote omitted). Professor Cass Sunstein has similarly noted the "received wisdom ... that Lochner
was wrong because it involved 'judicial activism.'" Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (I987). This view of Lochner as an emblem of the "illegitimate intrusion
by the courts into a realm properly reserved to the political branches of government," Sunstein
observes, has been endorsed by the Supreme Court in a host of cases encouraging the virtues of
"judicial deference to legislative enactments." I d.
6 See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 19-60 (I993); Michael
Les Benedict, Laissez Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of LaissezFaire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (I985); Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge
Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 577 (2002); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of LaissezFaire Constitutionalism, I863-I897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (I975).
7 See, e.g., William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 783.
8 See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-19IO, at 157-59, 164 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1993).
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demonstrates - generally persuasively, in my view - that the Lochner era is best understood not as a politically motivated binge of judicial activism, but rather as a sincere and principled, if sometimes
anachronistic, "effort to maintain one of the central distinctions in
nineteenth-century constitutional law - the distinction between valid
economic regulation" calculated to serve the general good and invalid
"class" legislation designed to extend special privileges to a favored
class of beneficiaries. 9
Professor Jed Shugerman's impressive recent article, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review,1O stakes
out new interpretive territory within this revisionist project. Shugerman reveals how, in the r850s, the first generation of elected state
judges transformed the Jacksonian antagonism toward "class" legislation into a countermajoritarian rationale for robust judicial review.u
Because judicial review had long been defended as a means of protecting "the people" against legislative overreaching, one might expect that
elected judges who were dependent on "the people" for their continued
tenure would embrace majoritarian rationales for voiding statutes
passed by democratically elected legislatures. Yet they did exactly the
opposite, driving what Shugerman pointedly calls a "counterintuitive
turn to countermajoritarianism,"12 marked by increased protection of
individual rights and an anti-populist conception of majority rule as a
"threat to higher law."13 By uncovering this fascinating story, Shugerman provides a rare fresh perspective from which to reflect on what is
perhaps the most venerable problematic in American constitutional
theory - the supposed tension between democratic lawmaking and
judicial review, also known as the "countermajoritarian difficulty."14
Shugerman's article thus not only revises our understanding of the origins of judicial elections; it makes an important contribution to the
vast literature on the history and politics of judicial review.

9 GILLMAN, supra note 6, at ro.
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV L. REV. I061 (20ro).
11 [d. at 1I24-1125.
12 [d. at 1I25.
13 [d. at 1I24.
14 The phrase is generally attributed to ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 16-18 (2d. ed. 1986). For an overview of the vast body of scholarly and judicial writing
on the subject, see a series of articles by Barry Friedman: Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
333 (I998); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. LJ. I (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of the Counterma.ioritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (200I); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 9/I (2000); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 1I2 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
10
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I find less compelling, however, Shugerman's further conclusion
that the adoption of judicial elections in the r850s, and the increasing
exercise of judicial review by the first generation of elected judges,
helped to effect a "transition from the early republic's active industrybuilding state to the laissez-faire constitutionalism that dominated the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century."15 This Response
argues that Shugerman overstates both the extent to which the adoption of judicial elections in the mid-nineteenth century was animated
by an "an overall laissez-faire, anti-regulation, anti-legislation ideology"16 and the extent to which the first generation of elected judges laid
the doctrinal foundation for the so-called Lochner era several decades
later. Jacksonian themes did indeed permeate Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence, but not as a countenance for laissez-faire.
Part II takes issue with Shugerman's claim that the adoption of
judicial elections in the r840s and r850s was driven by laissez-faire
ideological commitments. Section II.A briefly surveys a substantial
and growing body of historical scholarship demonstrating that laissezfaire ideology never, in fact, characterized the actual practice of state
governance at any time during the nineteenth century, and that during
the period Shugerman labels laissez-faire states actually extended their
regulatory reach into the economic marketplace as never before. Section ILB raises some interpretive questions about Shugerman's contention that the state constitutional convention delegates who adopted
judicial elections "embraced laissez-faire and the limited state."17 It
proposes that much of the evidence on which Shugerman relies to
demonstrate the connection between judicial elections and laissez-faire
constitutionalism suggests that delegates were motivated not by a general opposition to state interference in the economy, but rather by a
Jacksonian aversion to the corruption, patronage, and special privilege
that had plagued state legislatures in recent decades. Section II. C
challenges Shugerman's argument that the decisions rendered by the
first generation of elected judges in the r850s developed "substantive
due process" - the "core weapon and doctrine of the Lochner era"18
and a "pillar[] of laissez-faire constitutionalism for almost a century
thereafter."19 It suggests that Shugerman misreads the mid-century
uptick in judicial review in the service of "vested" property rights as
both an expression of laissez-faire ideology and the doctrinal foundation of the Lochner era.

15
16
17
18
19

Shugerman, supra note II, at 1068.
[d. at 1087.
[d. at ro82.
[d. at 1123.
[d. at II2I.
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Part III argues that by overstating the doctrinal continuities between the mid-century "vested rights" decisions and the police powers
jurisprudence of the Lochner era, Shugerman's account obscures the
more immediate - and in my view indispensible - causes and contexts of the "laissez-faire constitutionalism" of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century. If we are to draw a line of historical causation
from the mid-century "vested rights" decisions to the so-called "substantive due process" of the Lochner era, it must necessarily run
through the watershed historical events of slave emancipation and the
industrialization of labor, and the transformative constitutional
changes set in motion by the Reconstruction Amendments.
II. LAISSEZ-FAIRE IDEOLOGY AND STATE REGULATORY
AUTHORITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The first generation of elected judges did indeed act as the "more
aggressive and populist judiciary"20 that the reformers had hoped for,21
striking down many more state statutes than had their elected predecessors and "establishing a more widespread practice and acceptance
of judicial review in America."22 Perhaps most remarkably, as Shugerman demonstrates, these judges justified their increasingly frequent
practice of judicial review not as a "majoritarian institution, a means
of protecting the people" against an "overreaching legislature,"23 as we
might expect, but rather as a countermajoritarian defense of individual
rights rooted in an anti-populist conception of majority rule as a
"threat to higher law."24 Shugerman further argues, however, that increased prevalence of, and changing rationale for, judicial review
spurred, or at least abetted, a "shift from the active industry-building
state to the laissez-faire state."25 That argument depends on two key
factual premises: first, that there in fact was a shift from the "active"
state to the "laissez-faire" state; and second, that judicial review mea[d. at IIIS.
Shugerman's study poses a compelling challenge to leading historical accounts of the origins
of elected state judiciaries, which cast the adoption of judicial elections as one element of a concerted Jacksonian program to "rein in the power of all officials to act independently of the
people." [d. at ra64 n.I4 (quoting Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of the Scholarly Explanations
for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL RIST. 190, 224
(I993)). Shugerman demonstrates that for its advocates, the purpose of judicial elections was instead "to bolster judicial power and to propel the courts toward voiding more statutes." [d. at
ra68. Convention delegates and others concluded that judges elected directly by "the people"
would be independent of the patronage and cronyism that plagued the judicial appointments
process and thus better able to protect the rights of the people against legislatures that had been
"disgraced as corrupt and incompetent." [d. at ra67.
22 [d. at IIIS.
23 [d. at 1I24.
24 [d.
25 [d. at ra70.
20

21
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ningfully shaped the broad trajectory of state economic regulation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first premise
is at odds with a large and convincing body of historical scholarship.
The second is partially accurate with respect to a particular subclass of
police regulations - namely, laws regulating the terms of laborbut does not describe a broad ideological project or a general approach
to constitutional review that can properly be labeled "laissez-faire
constitutionalism. "
This Part begins by explaining that laissez-faire ideology did not
shape the general practice of state governance at any time in the nineteenth century, and that during the period Shugerman labels laissezfaire, the state actually extended its regulatory reach into the economic
marketplace as never before. It then poses some interpretive challenges to Shugerman's contention that the adoption of judicial elections in the 1840S and 1850S was animated by "an overall laissez-faire,
anti-regulation, anti-legislation ideology."26 It proposes, in particular,
that much of the evidence on which Shugerman relies to demonstrate
the connection between judicial elections and laissez-faire constitutionalism suggests that it was not a general opposition to state interference
in the economy that motivated delegates, but rather a Jacksonian aversion to the corruption, patronage, and special privilege that had
plagued state legislatures in recent decades. Finally, it challenges
Shugerman's conclusion that elected judges in the 1850S developed the
doctrinal pillars of laissez-faire constitutionalism, and maintains that
Shugerman misreads a mid-century expansion of judicial review in the
service of "vested" property rights as both an expression of laissez-faire
ideology and an early exposition of "substantive due process."

A. The Myth of the Laissez-Faire State
Shugerman states throughout the article that the upsurge in judicial review in the 1850S helped to displace the "active industrybuilding state" of the Jacksonian era with the "laissez-faire state" of
the Lochner era.27 Although Shugerman is a bit elusive regarding the
precise definition of the "laissez-faire state,"28 he suggests at several
points that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were cha26

Id. at ra87.

27 See id. at ra68, raio, 1123.
28 In contrast to the depth, specificity, and conceptual subtlety with which Shugerman defines
and explores the meaning of key concepts like "judicial independence" and "majoritarian" versus
"countermajoritarian" justifications for judicial review, he does not define with much precision the
article's other key concept - "laissez-faire," or more specifically, "laissez-faire constitutionalism."
This permits Shugerman to classify as an expression of "laissez-faire ideology" a collection of evidence involving the motives of the convention delegates, the meaning of the constitutions they
produced, and the decisions rendered by the first generation of elected judges that probably does
not warrant that label, at least as it is generally understood.
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racterized by the "remov[al] [of] the state from intervention in the capitalism that the state had helped to build."29 Shugerman's "laissez-faire
state" thus connotes something more than a kind of neo-Jacksonian
opposition to special legislative privileges - something closer to the
liberal "night watchman" state that is often associated with the Lochner era. Shugerman's supposition that there was something properly
termed a "laissez-faire state" is curious, in light of the burgeoning body
of historical literature documenting precisely the opposite: that notwithstanding a handful of "tabloid" judicial decisions striking down
police regulations, state intervention in the economy not only continued, but accelerated during the period he labels "laissez-faire."
Even as late-nineteenth-century "laissez-faireists" insisted that the
state and federal governments cease interfering with freedom of trade
and the natural laws of supply and demand, their protests failed to
shape either public policy or constitutional law. Leading laissez-faire
propagandists such as the sociologist William Graham Sumner and the
English philosopher Herbert Spencer advocated that government relinquish virtually all influence over private economic ordering, including protective tariffs, tax-funded subsidies for transportation development, postal subsidies, land grants, and the regulation of wages and
working conditions. 30 If this was the laissez-faire agenda, it failed entirely. As Professor Michael Les Benedict explained in a now-classic
article, "[m]erely cataloging these positions ... indicates that most
Americans found unpersuasive the argument that government could
not improve upon the 'natural' laws of economy."31 Indeed, as the socalled the "commonwealth historians" chronicled several decades ago,
nineteenth-century state legislatures were deeply involved in the economic development and regulation through the funding of public
works projects, subsidization of "private" development projects, issuance of corporate charters, and the liberal exercise of the police
power and the power of eminent domain. 32
29
30
31
32

Id. at 1I45.
See Benedict, supra note 6, at 30I-02.
Id. at 30 I.
See, e.g., OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861
(rev. ed. 1969.); HARRY N. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA (I968). For helpful discussions of the
"commonwealth" histories, see William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American
State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY 249 (Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth & Robert A.
Kagan eds., 2002); and Harry N. Scheiber, Government and the Economy: Studies of the "Commonwealth" Policy in Nineteenth-Century America, 3 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 135 (I972). On the
nineteenth-century state's active involvement in economic regulation and development, see
JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (I956), which Benedict characterizes as "from beginning
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State governments actively and consistently violated the fundamental tenets of laissez-faire, Benedict observes, as local authorities continued throughout the nineteenth century "to promote transportation
development with tax abatements, debt guarantees, and public subscription to stock issues," and to adopt "law after law promoting and
subsidizing economic development, regulating business practices, employment conditions, and labor relations."33 The basic complexion of
federal authority during the nineteenth century mirrored that of the
states. 34 Notwithstanding the mythology of the "Lochner era," and
contrary to Shugerman's premise, state and federal intermeddling in
"private" economic relationships actually proliferated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. "A new forcefulness and resourcefulness" infused discussions of the police power in the Lochner
era, concludes a leading historian of the American state, "as Progressives expanded the scale and scope of American legislative power."35
Far from withdrawing its hand from capitalism, as Shugerman suggests, the state thus extended its regulatory reach into the economic
marketplace as never before.

to end an implicit repudiation of the notion that Americans adhered to laissez-faire doctrines in
the I800s." Benedict, supra note 6, at 297 n.I5; see also GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND
REGULATION, I877-I9I6 (I965); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH
AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (I957); GEORGE H. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER
LAWS (I971).
33 Benedict, supra note 6, at 302. Benedict thus concludes that "[fJrom Missouri to Maine,
from the beginning to the end of the nineteenth century, governments were deeply involved in
lending, borrowing, building, and regulating." Id. at 302 (quoting Robert A. Lively, The American
System: A Review Article, 29 Bus. HIST. REV. 8I, 86 (I955» (internal quotation marks omitted).
34 The reality of federal governance throughout the nation's history, Professor William Novak
writes, "bears not the slightest resemblance to ideas about American laissez-faire, voluntarism, or
anti-statism." William J. Novak, The Myth of the "Weak" American State, I I3 AM. HIST. REV.
752, 760 (2008); see also RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS (I995); Karen Orren, The
Laws of Industrial Organizations, I87(}-I920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
AMERICA 53I (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). Novak emphasizes the
extensive historical "scale and scope" of the American state's "infrastructural power":
From the founding of the first national governing institutions to the conquest of western
lands; from the creation of a vast public infrastructure for the promotion of commerce to
the construction of a powerful defense and military establishment; from the expansion of
governmental powers of police, regulation, administration, and redistribution to the invention of new ways of policing citizens, aliens, races, morals, and gender relations in
the production of national culture, the infrastructural power of the American state seems
at times boundless, even borderless, as American legal, corporate, economic, and cultural
forms spread across the globe. It is this power - infrastructural power - that renders
commentary about American state weakness or statelessness unintelligible.
Novak, supra, at 763. Professor Brian Balogh's instructive recent book, A Government Out of
Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (2009), similarly chronicles the myriad (if sometimes inconspicuous) ways in which federal authority penetrated American social life and shaped economic development throughout the nineteenth century.
35 Novak, supra note 32, at 269.
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B. Was Laissez-Faire in the Air? Some Interpretive Skepticism
About New York's I846 Constitutional Convention
Shugerman's argument that the adoption of judicial elections was
animated by laissez-faire ideology rests largely on his analysis of New
York's r846 constitutional convention. The "Barnburner" Democrats
who dominated the convention and controlled its agenda, Shugerman
claims,
were liberal in the classical sense: they embraced laissez-faire and the limited state because they perceived that the wealthy and the party insiders ... had captured state power and used the state for patronage, 'class
legislation,' paper money, public debt, internal improvements, and redistributing property to play favorites and tighten their grip on power.36

The Barnburners forged an alliance at the convention with the Whigs,
Shugerman explains, and together constitutionalized a host of provisions designed to check legislative spending, prevent party patronage
and corruption, and prohibit the granting of monopolies and other
special privileges to individuals or corporations. 37 "[T]hese impulses
drove an overall laissez-faire, anti-regulation, anti-legislation ideology
with a broad populist base,"38 he concludes, thus helping to "lay the
foundation for the laissez-faire constitutionalism that ascended after
the Civil War."39
Shugerman's own evidence, however, suggests that Barnburners
and their allies can be characterized as "laissez-faire" only if one comprehends that term to encompass virtually any effort to constrain legislative authority, regardless of the proposed scope of such constraints,
or the ideology or political principle that animated them. Delegates
appear to have been motivated not by a general opposition to government involvement in the economy, but rather, as Shugerman acknowledges, by their aversion to the corruption, patronage, and special privilege that had plagued the legislative process in recent decades. 40
Indeed, the only direct evidence from the convention of a "laissez-faire,
anti-regulation, anti-legislation ideology" comes not from Barnburner
delegates, or even a Whig ally, but rather from a single renegade
"Hunker"41 - a faction of conservative Democrats that, though dominant in the mid-century New York Democratic Party (and thus closely

Shugerman, supra note II, at I082.
at ro86-87.
38 [d. at I087.
39 [d. at 1I25.
40 See id. at ro87-88.
41 Shugerman quotes that delegate, Campbell White, as stating that the people of the state are
"perfectly capable of taking care of themselves" and insisting that "all the interference of government that is desired or wanted" is the enforcement of contracts. [d. at I087; see also id. n.I55.
36

37 I d.
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associated with the corruption and patronage that suffused state governance), constituted only a small minority of convention delegates. 42
Otherwise, Shugerman relies on Democratic sources from outside
the convention to bolster his argument that convention delegates
adopted judicial elections in the service of a laissez-faire agenda. The
language quoted from a number of these supplementary sources, too,
tends to suggest that the authors opposed government intervention in
economic matters not out of principle, but because, again, they shared
in the widespread Jacksonian critique of special legislative privileges.
Shugerman's discussion of Samuel Medary's The New Constitution
provides a case in point. In 1849, Shugerman explains, Medary, a
"populist Democrat," published a series of pamphlets advocating a new
Ohio state constitution that provided for greater judicial independence. 43 Each issue of The New Constitution, Shugerman reports,
"was filled with statements like the following: "'The people are governed too much." ... We have too much law. . .. Give us but few
laws and a simple government, and the people will be prosperous,
happy and contended,"'44 and finally, '''that Government is best which
governs least. "'45 From this, Shugerman concludes that the pamphlets
expressed an "anti-legislature and anti-regulation perspective" and
suggests that The New Constitution could have been called "The Libertarian Manifesto."46 Yet other evidence - evidence that Shu german
quotes - resists this characterization. "Legislatures ... favored the
tyranny of property in place of protecting the meritorious and poor,"
charged another article. 47 "As it now is, we see legislatures spurning
the good and wise [candidates], and bribing men to become hypocrites,
and to rob us, as has been done in our public works, where knaves
have made fortunes in a few years out of the tax-ridden, oppressed
people."48 When we consider, as Shugerman notes, that The New Constitution often reprinted "socialist, pro-labor" articles 49 and that some

See id. at I081-82.
See id. at I099-IIOO.
44 [d. at IIOO (omissions in original) (quoting Reform, NEW CONST., Nov. If, 1849, reprinted
in SAMUEL MEDARY, THE NEW CONSTITUTION 40I, 405 (Columbus, Ohio, Samuel Medary
1849) (reprinting an article from the Georgetown Standard».
45 [d. at I IOO (quoting Biennial Sessions of the Legislature, NEW CONST., June 2, 1849, reprinted in MEDARY, supra note 44, at 65, 68 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reprinting an
article from the Piqua Enquirer».
46 [d. at I099.
47 [d. at lIOO-OI (quoting The New Constitution Assuming Shape, NEW CONST., Aug. 25,
1849, reprinted in MEDARY, supra note 44, at 257, 268 (reprinting an article from the St. Clairsville Gazette» (internal quotation marks omitted).
48 [d. at IIOI (alteration in original) (quoting The New Constitution Assuming Shape, NEW
CONST., Aug. 25, 1849, reprinted in MEDARY, supra note 44, at 257, 268 (reprinting an article
from the St. Clairsville Gazette» (internal quotation marks omitted).
49 [d. at I099.
42
43
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of its populist writers favored protection for debtors against their creditors (a classic bogeyman of nineteenth-century laissez-faireists) the
motto on its masthead - "Power is always stealing from the many to
the few"50 - takes on a different valence. Read through a populist
Jacksonian lens, The New Constitution begins to look less like a "libertarian manifesto" steeped in the ideology of laissez-faire than a critique
of legislative favoritism for the wealthy at the expense of the poor that
sometimes opportunistically adopted libertarian, laissez-faire rhetoric.
My purpose here is not to nitpick Shugerman's analysis, but rather
to highlight one particularly stark example of his over reading opposition to special legislative privileges as an embrace of laissez-faire. To
my mind, Shugerman's evidence expresses less libertarian values than
Jacksonian antagonism toward a more discrete species of "class legislation" that granted "special" privileges to the favored few. Populist
Democrats sought to reign in the legislature not because they despised
legislation per se, but because it had served as a vehicle of corruption
and of favoritism toward the wealthy. As one leading historian concluded after surveying the commonwealth histories and more recent
scholarship, "[I]t is simply no longer intellectually justifiable to characterize New York state policy circa r846 as 'laissez-faire' or 'negative
government. '''51

C. What "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism" Was Not
Just as laissez-faire ideology never dictated the actual practice of
state governance in the nineteenth century, neither did it shape judicial
decisionmaking. As a generation of revisionist scholarship has persuasively demonstrated, the so-called "laissez-faire constitutionalism" of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked less by a
general opposition to government involvement in the economic marketplace - the hallmark of the era's laissez-faireists - than a neoJacksonian disapproval of "class" legislation that extended special
privileges to the favored few. Further, even if we understand "laissezfaire" to mean something narrower and more modest than "removing
the state from intervention in ... capitalism,"52 I find unpersuasive
Shugerman's contention that the countermajoritarian vested rights decisions issued by elected judges in the r8sos laid the foundation of
Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence. Although the mid-century
decisions, with their aggressive use of judicial review in defense of
50 [d. at IIOO (quoting NEW CONST., May 5, 1849, reprinted in MEDARY, supra note 44,
at I, I).
51 William J. Novak, The Not-Sa-Strange Birth of the Modern American State: A Comment on
James A. Henretta's "Charles Evans Hughes and the Strange Death of Liberal America," 24 LAW
& RIST. REV. 193, 197 (2006).
52 Shugerman, supra note II, at 1I45.
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"vested rights," must be counted among the many historical precursors
to the constitutional economic rights announced in later cases, they
cannot properly be called the "major precedents"53 or "cause[s]"54 or
"pillars of the Lochner era."55
I.
The Folklore of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism." - Neither
state nor federal police power jurisprudence during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries can be accurately described as "laissezfaire." As the U.S. Supreme Court explained at the height of the socalled Lochner era, the police power was and remained expansive; it
was "not confined ... to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary,"56 but extended as well to "regulations designed to
promote the public convenience or the general prosperity."57
And in fact, federal and state courts - including those that authored such landmarks of "substantive due process" as Lochner, In re
Jacobs 58 and Godcharles v. Wigeman 59 - upheld the vast majority of
police regulations against constitutional challenge. While this observation is now a staple of modern revisionist scholarship, perhaps the
most compelling evidence for it lies in two empirical studies published
at the height of the Lochner era by the progressive legal historian
Charles Warren. 60 Warren examined the 560 decisions rendered between 1887 and 1911 in which the U.S. Supreme Court passed on the
constitutionality of a state statute in order to test the prevailing progressive critique that a Court in the grip of an outmoded individualism
had fallen out of step with "modern conditions," frustrating the ability
of state legislatures to exercise police authority in the interest of the
"general public welfare."61 Of those 560 cases involving "a social or
economic question," Warren reported, the Court had struck down only
three (including Lochner).62 "The actual record of the Court," he concluded, "thus shows how little chance a litigant has of inducing the
Court to restrict the police power of a State, or to overthrow State
laws under the 'due process' clause; in other words, it shows the Court

[d. at II2I.
[d. at II23.
55 [d. at II45.
56 Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 3II, 3I8 (I907) (rejecting due process challenge to Idaho law regulating the grazing of animals).
57 [d. at 3I7.
58 98 N.Y. 98 (I88 5).
59 6 A. 354 (Pa. I886).
60 Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power - The United States Supreme Court,
I3 COLUM. L. REV. 667 (I9I3) [hereinafter Warren, A Bulwark]; Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, I3 COLUM. L. REV. 294 (I9I3) [hereinafter Warren,
Progressiveness ].
61 Warren, A Bulwark, supra note 60, at 667; see also id. at 669.
62 Warren, Progressiveness, supra note 60, at 295.
53

54
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to be a bulwark to the State police power, not a destroyer."63 Modern
scholars confirm Warren's assessment. 64 The handful of iconic cases
that are held up as emblems of laissez-faire constitutionalism, in other
words, were the exception rather than the rule.
Lochner-era courts did indeed discover novel constitutional economic rights, as Shugerman suggests, and occasionally mounted robust
(and even dramatic) defenses of those rights against overzealous legislatures. Shugerman misreads this judicial escalation of rights talk,
however, as an expression of laissez-faire. Viewed within its broader
historical trajectory, rather than through the narrow lens of a few exceptional cases, the constitutionalization of individual economic rights
reflected not a far-reaching constraint on the regulatory authority of
the states, but rather a complement to, and even a component of, the
unprecedented expansion of that authority. As the historian William
Novak puts it, "An expanded zone of private protection and individual
autonomy" in the form of new constitutional protections "was quid pro
quo for the radical extension of state power in this period."65 Far from
impeding the development of the liberal, progressive state, with its
myriad regulatory interventions into the industrial economy, the constitutionalization of private economic rights constructively mediated between public power and individual autonomy, thus making the expansion of state authority possible.
2.
"Vested Rights" and the Origins of "Substantive Due Process." - Shugerman similarly over-interprets mid-century judges' increasing willingness to protect vested property rights against legislative
encroachment, coupled with the emerging countermajoritarian rationale for judicial review, as the doctrinal cornerstone of a full-blown
"laissez-faire constitutionalism" that would prevail decades later. His
discussion of the r856 case Wynehamer v. People 66 is illustrative. In
Wynehamer, the New York Court of Appeals struck down a criminal
statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors. 67 The court relied
"on the innovative grounds of substantive due process,"68 Shugerman
maintains, thus furnishing a "major precedent[]"69 and a "core weapon"70 of Lochner-era jurisprudence. While Wynehamer furnishes a ter[d. at 3IO.
See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 4; Benedict, supra note 6, at 297,304; William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, I870-I920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 34, at 643,645; Novak, supra note 34, at 273; Orren, supra note
34, at 532.
65 Novak, supra note 32, at 265.
66 13 N.Y. 378 (I856).
67 See id. at 405-06.
68 Shugerman, supra note II, at 1I26.
69 [d. at I I 2 1.
70 [d. at 1I23.
63
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rific example of an early "anti-populist, countermajoritarian"71 theory
of judicial review, however, it requires an interpretive stretch
to read it as "establish[ing] ... one of the pillars of laissez-faire
constitutionalism."72
Wynehamer was decided by a divided court, which produced four
separate opinions. The lead opinion - and the one on which Shugerman bases his interpretation - was written by the court's junior
judge, George Comstock, who wrote only for himself. Judge Comstock's opinion striking down the statute was indeed grounded in the
New York Constitution's injunction that "no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law."73 Because New
Yorkers held a vested property right in the liquor they possessed at the
time of the statute's enactment, Judge Comstock concluded, the regulation constituted an unlawful confiscation, and even "destruction," of
propertyJ4 Despite Judge Comstock's invocation of the state's due
process clause and vested property rights, the opinion actually reads
less like a Lochner-era "substantive due process" decision than a historically familiar defense of vested property rights.7s Indeed, the statute encroached unconstitutionally upon the plaintiff's property right
in his liquor precisely because the legislature failed to distinguish between liquor that he already possessed at the time the statute was
enacted and his right to sell liquor acquired in the future. Regulation
of the latter, Judge Comstock insisted, remained comfortably within
legislature's authority to police the health, morals, and welfare of the
state's citizens. 76 Had the legislature prohibited the sale only of intoxicating liquors imported or manufactured after the statute took effect,
and not applied the law to "property innocently acquired under exist71 [d. at 1124.

I d. at I I 2 I.
Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 383 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. I § 6).
74 I d. at 385-86.
75 See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coli. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Dash v. Van
Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. 1811). Shugerman similarly claims that newly elected judges relied on
"substantive due process" to limit New York's Married Women's Property Act of 1848. Shugerman, supra noteII, at II25. Like in Wynehamer, however, in that case the New York Court of
Appeals merely held that a husband held a vested right under the state Due Process Clause in a
legacy bequeathed to his wife by her father before the 1848 Act took effect. See Westervelt v.
Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854).
76 As Judge Comstock assured his readers, the court's decision was "not intended to narrow
the field of legislature discretion in regulating and controlling the traffic in intoxicating liquors.
We only say that, in all such legislation, the essential right of the citizen to his property must be
preserved." Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 405. Indeed, Judge Comstock quotes Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386 (1798), at length to emphasize the ex post facto nature of the constitutional infirmity:
"The legislature cannot change innocence into guilt, or punish innocence as a crime, or violate the
right of antecedent lawful private contract, or the right of private property." Wynehamer, 13 N.Y.
at 391 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388 (emphasis added» (internal quotation mark omitted).
72

73
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ing laws,"77 Judge Comstock suggested, the regulation would have
survived constitutional review.
I do not mean to suggest that Judge Comstock's robust, highprofile defense of private property rights is unrelated to the "substantive due process" decisions of the Lochner era. Indeed, the New York
Court of Appeals later relied on Wynehamer in In re Jacobs 78 for the
important proposition that "[w ]hen a law annihilates the value of
property," the owner is deprived of his property within the meaning of
the constitutional right to due process of law. 79 However, while Wynehamer furnished helpful precedent for the police powers jurisprudence
of the Lochner era, it remains a far cry from later prototypical "substantive due process" opinions, including Justice Field's dissent in the
Slaughter-House Cases,80 high-profile state court decisions such as Jacobs and Godcharles v. Wigeman,81 as well as Lochner itself. As I explain below, such decisions are distinctive not for their protection of
vested property rights, but rather for their constitutionalization of the
economic liberty to pursue one's avocation and sell one's labor.
III. IN SEARCH OF "LAISSEZ-FAIRE CONSTITUTIONALISM"

This Part attempts to reground the Lochner era's iconic, if unrepresentative, police powers jurisprudence within its immediate historical
context in order to explain why the Jacksonian vocabulary of class interest and special privilege resonated with courts in the final decades
of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. It
suggests that by overstating the role of mid-century vested rights decisions, Shugerman's account obscures subsequent, more immediate historical "causes" of laissez-faire constitutionalism. If we are to draw a
line of historical causation between Wynehamer and the substantive
due process of the Lochner era, it must necessarily run through the watershed historical events of slave emancipation and the emergence of
an industrial proletariat, and the transformative constitutional changes
ushered in by the Reconstruction Amendments. To the extent that
Lochner-era courts did selectively constitutionalize economic liberty,
postbellum doctrinal innovations by jurists such as Justice Stephen
Field and Thomas Cooley are indispensable to the origins story that
Shugerman proposes to tell.

77 I d. at 385-86.
98 N.Y. 98 (r885) (striking down a state law prohibiting the manufacture of cigars in tene-

78

ment houses as an unconstitutional deprivation of economic liberty and property).
79 [d. at r06 (quoting Wynehamer, r3 N.Y. at 398) (internal quotation mark omitted).
80 83 U.S. (r6 Wall.) 36, 83-IIr (r873) (Field, J., dissenting).
81 6 A. 354 (Pa. r886) (striking down a state law providing that laborers in iron mills be paid
in U.S. currency as an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty of contract).
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A. Free Labor, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Constitutionalization of Economic Liberty
Justice Field's seminal dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House
Cases 82 is essential to any account of the origins of the Lochner era.
With three co-dissenters, Justice Field insisted that the Louisiana legislature, by chartering a slaughterhouse and granting it a twenty-fiveyear butchering monopoly, had deprived New Orleans butchers excluded from the monopoly of their privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 83
Of what, exactly, did those privileges and immunities consist? Justice
Field's answer provided an indispensible precedent for the constitutionalization of economic liberty during the last third of the nineteenth
century. He wrote:
This equality of right ... in the lawful pursuits of life ... is the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States. To them, everywhere,
all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all others .... This is the
fundamental idea upon which our institutions rest, and unless adhered to
in the legislation of the country our government will be a republic only in
name. The fourteenth amendment ... makes it essential ... that this
equality of right should be respected .... And it is to me a matter of profound regret that [the] validity [of the butchering monopoly] is recognized
by a majority of this court, for by it the right of free labor, one of the most
sacred and imprescriptible rights of man, is violated. 84

Justice Field's rendering of constitutional economic liberty channeled a generation of republican "free labor" ideology into a constitutional injunction against state abridgment of the "equality of right
among citizens in the pursuit of the ordinary avocations of life."85 At
the heart of the "free labor" ideal was the figure of the self-employed
farmer or skilled artisan. In republican political theory, a man's ownership of productive property, and his "independence" in the pursuit of
his economic calling, had long guaranteed both his economic selfsufficiency and his virtuous, independent citizenship.86 To labor for a
wage, by contrast, was to forfeit one's independence - to subject
one's personal autonomy, and even political will, to the authority of an

82 83 U.S. (I6 Wall.) at 83-II1 (Field, J., dissenting). My analysis draws from William Forbath's important article, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age,
supra note 7, at 773-79.
83 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (I6 Wall.) at lIO (Field, J., dissenting).
84 [d. at I09-IO.
85 [d. at I09.
86 See generally DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY 25-44 (I967); Forbath, supra
note 7, at 774-77.
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employer.87 In the post-Civil War period, the republican vision fell into jeopardy as never before as the industrial revolution transformed
small farmers and skilled craftsmen into propertyless wage earners,
and as immigrants from Europe and China joined the ranks of the nation's growing army of industrial hirelings. "The butchers whose
rights Justice Field championed in the Slaughter-House Cases," explains historian William Forbath, stood as exemplars of the old free
labor ideal: They were self-employed petty entrepreneurs struggling
against a state-imposed monopoly that threatened to subject them to
the control of the new corporation, depriving them of their independence and reducing them to the condition of wage laborers.88
If Justice Field's opinion championed the butchers' republican independence, however, it also laid the constitutional groundwork for a
very different and, in the postbellum period, ascendant conception of
economic liberty. Immediately following the passage quoted above
trumpeting the republican virtues of free labor, Justice Field inserted a
long footnote quoting at length Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations:
"The property which every man has in his own labor," says Adam Smith,
"as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength
and dexterity of his own hands; and to hinder him from employing his
strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to
his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those
who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the other from employing
whom they think proper."89

If this was an expression of economic liberty lifted directly from
one of the seminal texts of classical liberal political economy, it was also a vision that resonated deeply with the great moral and political
cause of the previous generation - the abolition of slavery. Abolitionists had celebrated the voluntary sale of one's labor as the antithesis of
slavery, and the right to dispose of one's labor at market price had
taken on the moral and emotional weight of opposing human bondage.
Slave emancipation and the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,90
securing the right to contract for the sale of one's labor as an essential

87 See generally LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE 22-24 (I997); MONTGOMERY,
supra note 86, at 30-33; AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT 9-IO (I998);
Forbath, supra note 7, at 774-75.
88 Forbath, supra note 7, at 776.
89 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (I6 Wall.) at IrO n* (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting ADAM
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 225 (Penguin Classics 1986) (I776)).
90 Ch. 3I, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.c.).

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 123:55

right of citizenship, enshrined this vision into law. 91 Most importantly,
by extolling workers' "sacred property" in their own labor and their
"liberty" to dispose of that property as they thought proper, Smith, and
Justice Field, offered a vision of economic liberty adapted not to a republic of independent artisans and craftsmen, but to the propertyless
hirelings who populated the swelling industrial labor force. It was the
liberal, Smithian, abolitionist, and distinctly industrial-era conception
of economic liberty that occasionally found its way into latenineteenth-century judicial opinions.
Whether we read Justice Field's dissent as a conservative defense
of the waning republican free labor ideal or the handmaiden of an
emergent industrial-era political economy, the intellectual and jurisprudential legacy of the opinion lies in its radical redefinition of "liberty" and "property." In this project, Justice Field was joined by the jurist and treatise writer Thomas Cooley, whose influential Treatise on
Constitutional Limitations, first published in r 868, argued that the
state due process clauses placed significant substantive limits on the
authority of legislatures to regulate common law property rights. 92 For
Cooley and for Justice Field, "property" could encompass not only land
and tangible goods, but anything with market value; "liberty" meant
not only physical freedom, but freedom to act in the marketplace, and
particularly to sell one's labor.93 After Slaughter-House, Forbath
notes, those who felt unjustly burdened by a particular economic regulation "could proceed to court with Field's sacred banner of Free Labor in one hand and Cooley's Treatise in the other."94
When litigants did exactly that, they were received warmly by state
high courts on at least a few occasions. Indeed, the handful of opinions from the r880s striking down state labor regulations read like
tributes to Justice Field and Cooley. The New York Court of Appeals'
91 See generally STANLEY, supra note 87, at I-59; Forbath, supra note 7, at 782-86. In determining what, exactly, were the privileges and immunities that the Fourteenth Amendment protected from state abridgement, Justice Field turned first to the recently enacted Civil Rights Act
of 1866. Although passed before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Field explained, the Civil Rights Act expressed Congress' interpretation of the term "privileges and immunities" as it was used in section I. It includes, Justice Field wrote, quoting directly from the
Act, the right "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31 § I, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1981» (internal quotation marks omitted). Among such rights,
Justice Field continued, "must be placed the right to pursue a lawful employment in a lawful
manner, without other restraint than such as equally effects all persons." I d. at 97.
92 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 351-61
(5th ed. 1883).
93 See Benedict, supra note 6; Forbath, supra note 7, at 792-94.
94 Forbath, supra note 7, at 794.
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opinion in In re Jacobs, which invalidated a law prohibiting the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses, exemplifies the new property and
liberty: "The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived
of his property without due process of law may be violated without the
physical taking of property .... "95 Any law that "destroys it or its
value, or takes away any of its essential attributes," would deprive a
person of his property. 96 So, too, could a person be unconstitutionally
deprived of his liberty "without the actual imprisonment or restraint of
his person."97 "Liberty, in its broad sense as understood in this country," the court continued, "means the right, not only of freedom from
actual servitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the right of one to use
his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn
his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or
avocation."98 Laws that "limit one in his choice of a trade or profession, or confine him to work or live in a specified locality,"99 are therefore "infringements upon his fundamental rights of liberty."lOo
If the term "substantive due process" means anything, then, it is
that the state, and later federal, due process clauses protect both a
man's property right in his avocation - whether the means of conducting his trade or the sale of his labor - and his liberty to pursue it.
If the statute at issue in Wynehamer had been reviewed through this
distinctly late-nineteenth-century constitutional lens, the analysis may
have looked quite different. At issue would have been not only Wynehamer's "vested" right to dispose of the liquor he already had in his
warehouse, but also his constitutional liberty to engage in his avoca-

re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, lO5 (r885).
Id.
97 I d. at lO6.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 I d. at r07. Two years later, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania echoed the Jacobs court's
conception of economic liberty. In Godcharles v. Wigeman, the court struck down a state law requiring that iron workers be paid in cash at regular intervals, rather than in company "script," as
an unconstitutional attempt to
prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own contracts. The act is an infringement alike of the rights of the employer and the employe. More than this, it is an
insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States.
He may sell his labor for what he thinks best, whether money or goods, just as his employer may sell his iron or coal; and any and every law that proposes to prevent him
from so doing so is an infringement of his constitutional privileges, and consequently vicious and void.
6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. r886). See also State v. Goodwill, lO S.E. 285 (W. Va. r889) (striking down a
law forbidding payment in company script on the ground that it interfered with the "liberty" of
every man "to pursue any lawful trade or avocation," id. at 286 (quoting People v. Gillson, 17
N.E. 345 (N.Y. r888» (internal quotation mark omitted), and the "property which every man has
in his own labor," id. at 287).
95 In
96

74
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tion of selling liquor, including liquor that he might acquire in the
future.

B. "Class Legislation" in the Industrial Era
As I suggest above,101 there is today broad recognition among historians and legal scholars that Lochner-era courts little resembled the
hyper-vigilant guardians of the private market and individual economic liberty long imagined by the "progressive" critics of "laissez-faire
constitutionalism." State and federal judges did not oppose government interference in the market per se, but rather those forms of interference that they interpreted as "class" legislation, serving the narrow
interests of a particular social or economic group over those of the
general public. A generation of legal historians has produced a sizeable and fascinating literature tracing Lochner-era scrutiny of such
class legislation to the Jacksonian opposition to special legislative privileges. In particular, a series of intellectual-biographical studies of
leading icons of laissez-faire constitutionalism persuasively present jurists such as Justice Stephen Field and Thomas Cooley not as laissezfaire ideologues, but rather as principled neo-Jacksonians, committed
to the defense of the general good against the corrupting influence of
powerful economic interests.102 Even though I have taken issue with
Shugerman's characterization of this Jacksonian impulse as a variety
of "laissez faire," his contention that Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence was built on Jacksonian foundations enjoys abundant support in the existing literature.
As historians and legal scholars continue to excavate evidence
of the Lochner era's rich ancestry, however, we should not lose sight of
why the Jacksonian vocabulary of class interest and special privilege
resonated with American courts in the final decades of the nineteenth
century and first decades of the twentieth - in other words, why the
Lochner-era happened when it did. Notwithstanding the splendid,
multivalent complexity of its intellectual origins, "laissez-faire constitutionalism" was in fact deeply imbedded in its immediate historical context - a context characterized, above all, by the industrial reorganization of labor, the consequent escalation of class conflict, and the
emergence of a host of reform initiatives directed toward redressing

101 See sources cited supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. RIST. 751 (1967); McCurdy, supra note 6. But see Manuel Cachan, Justice
Stephen Field and "Free Soil, Free Labor Constitutionalism": Reconsidering Revisionism, 20
LAW & RIST. REV. 541 (2002) (challenging Justice Field's Jacksonian bona fides and arguing that
by the Gilded Age, free labor ideology had absorbed elements of laissez-faire ideology).
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industrial inequality. As Professor Howard Gillman explains, during
the last third of the nineteenth century,
changes were occurring in the structure of capitalist social relations that
led increasing numbers of people to question whether their well-being
could be protected by a formally neutral polity. These changes triggered a
proliferation of group and class activity as powerful interests began demanding special favors from government and vulnerable groups began
demanding special protection from the coercive effects of a corporate industrial economy. These demands constituted a direct challenge to an established tenet of political legitimacy, and the legal community - state
courts and legal commentators - responded accordingly in repeated condemnations of illegitimate "class" politics. 103

The critical duty of Lochner-era courts, as the guardians of state
neutrality, was thus to distinguish between the vast majority of police
regulations that were legitimately directed toward the public health
and welfare and the illegitimate minority that were calculated to serve
the interests of a narrow class.
In one respect, then, Lochner-era resistance to legislation that appeared to promote narrow class interests rather than the general welfare simply continued the judiciary's traditional commitment to the
principle of state neutrality. But the complexion of that resistance especially the kinds of legislation that courts interpreted as "class" legislation - was also fundamentally a product of the class conflict and
economic inequality that accompanied the industrialization of
the northern economy. Indeed, the police regulations that attracted the
most aggressive judicial scrutiny tended to be statutes that sought to
restore to wage laborers some measure of bargaining power relative
to their employers l04 - the signature reforms of the industrial era.
Lochner itself is a prime example. It was precisely the majority's
recognition of a newly minted constitutional right of property in and
liberty to dispose of one's labor that triggered the Court's scrutiny of
the challenged regulation. lo5 Echoing the conception of constitutional

103 GILLMAN, supra note 6, at l4 (footnote omitted). As Professor Owen Fiss pointedly observes, "[t]he activism of Melville Fuller ... was a method of resistance, a way of coping with new
forms of social and political organization and activity." FISS, supra note 8, at 20. Other leading
scholars likewise characterize Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence as a reaction to legislative
efforts to address the era's accelerating economic inequality. As Professor Morton Horwitz explains, "the inherently redistributive potential of the police power emerged with a vengeance" in
response to "the reality of an increasingly unequal society," thus dissolving "the relatively fixed
common law categories on which police power doctrines had been erected" and blurring the traditional "distinction between the health of a worker and the conditions of industrial life." MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, l870-l960, at 30 (l992).
104 See Forbath, supra note 64, at 649; Orren, supra note 34 at 533.
105 In this I differ with some among the current generation of revisionist historians, whose insistence that "laissez-faire constitutionalism" was animated by Jacksonian principles of state neutrality rather than by laissez-faire economic ideology or naked class interest has minimized, al-
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economic liberty set forth in Justice Field's Slaughter-House dissenta conception, as I noted above, that was inseparable from both abolitionism and the industrial transformation of labor - the majority concluded with little difficulty that the "right to make a contract in relation to [one's] business," and particularly the "right to purchase or to
sell labor," was "part of the liberty of the individual protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."106
With the constitutional stakes thus clarified, the Court turned to
whether the regulation was a "reasonable and appropriate exercise of
the police power of the State," or instead "an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his
personalliberty."107 The Court "dismissed in a few words" any suggestion that legislation enacted to benefit workers qua workers implicated
the general welfare. "Viewed in the light of a purely labor law," it concluded, "the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected .... "108 The Court likewise denied that a law regulating the
hours of labor worked by bakers might lie within the state's police authority as a "health law." The state's contention that the purpose of
the act was to protect the public health was so utterly unpersuasive,
the majority maintained, that it was "impossible for [the Court] to shut
[its] eyes" to the legislature's "other motives."109 "[T]he real object and
purpose" of the act, the majority charged, "were simply to regulate the
hours of labor between the master and his employes."110
In thus concluding that a law altering the existing balance of bargaining power between employers and workers could not reasonably
be interpreted as serving the general welfare, the Court plunged headfirst into the consuming social and political issue of the day - the socalled "labor problem." Even as the venerable Jacksonian value of
state neutrality guided the Court's scrutiny of New York's "labor law,"
the majority's basic justification for that scrutiny - the reason, by its
own insistence, that it was compelled to scrutinize this interference
with the purchase and sale of labor - lay not in the anti-classlegislation principles of the Jacksonians, or the vested rights precedents
of the r850s, but rather in an emergent conception of workers' liberty
most to the point of invisibility, the role played by the constitutionalization of economic liberty in
Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence. Under this view, the Lochner Court upheld "liberty of
contract" against legislative encroachment not as a positive constitutional right that imposed an
"external" constraint on the authority of the state, but rather as a residuum of freedom that "remained to the individual after the state reached the outer bounds of its authority." Frss, supra
note 8, at I59.
106 Lochner v. New York, I98 U.S. 45, 53 (I905).
107 Id.at56.
108 Id. at 57.
109 I d. at 64.
110 Id.
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to dispose of their labor that was rooted in the anti-slavery movement
and the neoclassical political economy of the industrial era. 111

IV. CONCLUSION
Jed Shugerman's article offers an enlightening account of how the
first generation of elected state judges transformed the Jacksonian antagonism toward "class" legislation into a countermajoritarian rationale for robust judicial review, characterized by an enhanced protection of individual rights and an anti-populist conception of majority
rule as a "threat to higher law." This Response challenges Shugerman's further suggestion, however, that the expansion of judicial review in the r850s, sometimes in the service of "vested" property rights,
helped to effect a "transition from the early republic's active industrybuilding state to the laissez-faire constitutionalism that dominated the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century."112
The challenge rests on two related grounds. First, despite the persistence of "progressive" mythology, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were hardly "dominated" by an approach to constitutional review that can fairly be characterized as "laissez-faire." Despite
a handful of now-notorious decisions striking down police regulations
in a manner that, in hindsight, can appear almost ostentatious, state
and federal courts upheld the vast majority of Lochner-era economic
legislation. Second, Shugerman overemphasizes the mid-century origins of "laissez-faire constitutionalism" at the expense of the watershed
historical events that transformed American constitutional culture during the last third of the nineteenth century. These historical developments provide the immediate context for, and give essential meaning
to, the era's iconic (if unrepresentative) police power jurisprudence.
To the extent that Lochner-era courts did constitutionalize economic
liberty (and they did, albeit highly selectively), they were inspired less
by the vested rights jurisprudence that preceded the Civil War than by
the constitutional and industrial revolutions that followed it. Shugerman's account both overdetermines the historical meaning of the midcentury decisions and correspondingly casts Lochner-era courts as his-

111 The frequent observation that the Lochner Court measured the neutrality of police regulations against a "common law baseline" may likewise dehistoricize the constitutionalization of economic liberty. As Sunstein writes of Lochner, "Market ordering under the common law was understood to be a part of nature rather than a legal construct, and it formed the baseline from
which to measure the constitutionally critical lines that distinguished ... neutrality from impermissible partisanship." Sunstein, supra note 5 at 874. While I agree that the Court's conception
of state neutrality was informed by its presumption of a "common law baseline," that fact, without more, does not account for why the Court constitutionalized certain forms of economic liberty
when it did.
112 Shugerman, supra note II, at r068.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 123:55

torically decontextualized receptacles of decades-old precedent. The
result is an account of the origins of the Lochner era that tells us little
about why, exactly, the Lochner era happened when it did.

